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MATCHING, ASPIRATION AND LONG-TERM RELATIONSHIP
IN-KOO CHO AND AKIHIKO MATSUI
Abstract. This paper studies a simple matching model with a single population where
players, who are identical ex ante but not necessarily so ex post, are randomly matched
and decide whether or not to form a long-term relationship. When two agents are
matched, they observe a relation-speciﬁc productivity as well as their respective shares
and decide whether or not to agree to form a long-term relationship. The pair forms a
long-term relation if and only if both the agents in the pair agree to do so; otherwise, they
join the pool of singles, who continuously search for partners. A long-term relationship
is subject to a small probability of break-up, which results in both the players going back
to the pool of singles. Each agent agrees to form a long-term relationship if and only
if his share exceeds his own past average payoﬀ. It is shown that almost all the agents
in the society are engaged in a long-term relationship and play the symmetric eﬃcient
outcome.
Keywords: Matching, Long-Term Relationship, Aspiration, Pure Symmetric Eﬃcient
State, Stochastic Approximation, Lyapunov Function
1. Introduction
Many social interactions occur among the same group of agents who voluntarily partic-
ipate in a long-term relationship. Examples abound. Most business relations are repeated
not by force, but by choice. A typical relationship between a worker and an employer is
built upon a long-term relationship which starts with a matching between the two parties
(e.g., Mortensen and Pissarides (1994)).
Extensive investigations of repeated games under various institutional and informational
assumptions have oﬀered us a useful insight on the outcomes of a long-term relationship.
However, the existing literature on repeated games remains silent about how and why a
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long-term relationship is formed among players, and which outcome becomes a pervasive
social norm. This paper provides a social dynamic foundation for a long-term relationship
by formulating and analyzing a decentralized matching model, where the players choose to,
rather than are assumed to, initiate the long-term relationship. Our goal is to understand
the conditions under which a long-term relationship can arise from decentralized social
interactions to become a dominant form of social institution.
We shall examine a simple canonical matching model with a single population where
players are randomly matched and decide whether or not to form a long-term relationship.
When two agents are matched, they observe a relation-speciﬁc productivity as well as their
respective shares and decide whether or not to agree to form a long-term relationship. The
pair forms a long-term relation if and only if both the agents in the pair agree to do so;
otherwise, they join the pool of singles, who continuously search for partners. A long-term
relationship is subject to a small probability of break-up, which results in both the players
going back to the pool of singles. The interaction between the matching process and the
long-term relationship is the focus of our analysis.
One might pursue an equilibrium analysis by formulating the long-term relationship as
a repeated game, embedded in a random matching process. We need to endow the agents
with an exceedingly powerful computational capability to calculate one’s best responses
against a proﬁle of other agents’ strategies and a physical environment. However, as we
are interested in the case where the long-term relationship is subject to a small probability
of break-up, we have a large set of equilibria from the repeated game, and the equilibrium
analysis provides little guidance to select a particular equilibrium. Unless the agent knows
the expected gain from the long-term relationship through a commonly known equilibrium
selection rule, it would be impossible to ﬁgure out the way in which the players decide to
form a long-term relationship after on observing the relation speciﬁc outcome.
Instead, we opt for a model with bounded rationality, in which the players have only
a limited computational capability and may not know the structure of the game, the
distribution of strategies, or the future course of evolution. Each agent in our model uses
a simple rule of thumb that uses the average payoﬀ of the past as the threshold. If the
current match gives a higher payoﬀ than the past average, then the agent is willing toMATCHING, ASPIRATIONS, AND LONG-TERM RELATIONSHIP 3
initiate the long-term relationship. On the other hand, if it gives a lower payoﬀ than the
past average, then the agent chooses to terminate the partnership.
This principle of decision making is more closely related to the satisﬁcing theory of
Simon (1987)–later elaborated by Rubinstein (1993), Gilboa and Schmeidler (1995), Cho
(1995), Karandikar, Mookherjee, Ray, and Vega-Redondo (1998), Bendor, Mookherjee,
and Ray (2007) and Cho and Matsui (2005)–than to the standard optimizing theory in
the sense that each agent compares what is obtained today with what has been obtained
in the past while making a decision on whether or not to continue the current relationship.
The above decision problem is simple, not only because each agent uses a threshold
strategy as in the standard search theory, but because he uses the past average as a
threshold–which may be called an aspiration level–by ignoring the context under which
the payoﬀ was realized. Being a simple average of his payoﬀs from the past plays, the
aspiration level coincides with the steady state payoﬀ, if one exists, which ensures an
asymptotic consistency with the stationary distribution of the outcomes of our model. As
we shall prove the existence of a unique steady state, our approach will oﬀer a criterion
for selecting a particular equilibrium outcome from a long-term relationship.
Even though we simplify the decision rule signiﬁcantly, the model remains highly com-
plex. We have to keep track of the state of a society populated with many players who
can either be single or paired with someone else. As a result, a component of the state is
the cross sectional description of the social interaction, identifying who is in the pool and
who is paired with whom. In a large society, the number of all the possible conﬁgurations
of social interactions is very large, and the number of states in our model is even larger. In
addition to the large state space, we have to handle the non-stationarity of the aspiration
level and resulting non-stationarity of the decision to initiate the long run relationship,
both of which arise from the interaction between the aspiration level and the repeated
game outcome. Our task is to characterize the asymptotic properties of a non-stationary
stochastic process of aspiration levels in a high dimensional Euclidean space.
By invoking the stochastic approximation technique (Kushner and Yin (1997)), we can
approximate the sample path of the stochastic process in terms of a trajectory induced4 IN-KOO CHO AND AKIHIKO MATSUI
by an ordinary diﬀerential equation (ODE).
1 Although this approximation dramatically
simpliﬁes the analysis, the resulting deterministic dynamics is still too complex to handle
because the evolution of the individual aspiration level is aﬀected by the entire proﬁle of
the aspiration vector. Inspired by the model reduction technique developed for the analysis
of complex stochastic network (Meyn (2007)), we characterize the convergence properties
of the aspiration vector by analyzing a lower dimensional vector of aspiration levels. That
is, instead of examining the entire proﬁle of the aspiration vector in the ODE, we focus
on the dynamics of the largest and smallest element of the aspiration vector in the ODE
to infer the asymptotic properties of the entire vector. The model reduction technique
drastically simpliﬁes the analysis, but also renders the characterization result very robust
as the key asymptotic properties depend upon the two extreme elements instead of the
entire proﬁle of aspiration levels.
We demonstrate that if the probability of exogenous break down is small and the econ-
omy has a suﬃciently large number of agents, then the proportion of agents who remain
in a partnership with the same agent is close to one. Despite the absence of the central-
ized information processing or matching mechanism, the aspiration level of every agent
converges to the the Pareto eﬃcient symmetric outcome of the component game, which
is a natural focal point outcome (Schelling (1960)). In this sense, the Nash bargaining
solution is derived–as opposed to assumed, as is the case in many existing models–from
the underlying matching process followed by a long-term relationship.
Any attempt to obtain more than the payoﬀ in the symmetric eﬃcient state triggers the
termination of the partnership, dumping both agents into the pool of singles. Despite the
absence of a centralized authority, every agent in the society appears to behave according
to the rule, “Don’t be greedy if you want to have a long-term relationship with your
partner.” The same rule applies to any agent regardless of his history of outcomes, which
can be considered as a social norm.
1The same technique has been widely used in macro and microeconomic models, including Marcet and
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The long-term relationship with an option to drop out was studied by Ghosh and
Ray (1996), Carmichael and McLeod (1997) and recently, by Fujiwara-Greve and Okuno-
Fujiwara (2009). Ghosh and Ray (1996) constructed a random matching model with an
option of continuing the relationship upon a mutual agreement. They used a concept that
allows the party to make a joint deviation and showed that the only eﬃcient outcome
emerges as a stable outcome. Their equilibrium concept has a ﬂavor of strong equilibrium
(Aumann (1959)) and selects the Pareto eﬃcient outcomes from the model under a certain
conditions. Fujiwara-Greve and Okuno-Fujiwara (2009) applied the standard equilibrium
approach to a similar environment. They focused on a particular type of eﬃcient stable
state; otherwise, they would have gotten a result similar to the folk theorem. Carmichael
and McLeod (1997) constructed a random matching model wherein agents are forced to
form a long-term relation once matched with an option of cheap-talk and gift-giving. They
then applied a weaker version of evolutionarily stable strategy to show that the symmetric
eﬃcient outcome is attained in the repeated prisoners’ dilemma.
The present paper is closely related to Karandikar, Mookherjee, Ray, and Vega-Redondo
(1998) and Cho and Matsui (2005) in terms of both the behavior rule and technique.
Karandikar, Mookherjee, Ray, and Vega-Redondo (1998) and Cho and Matsui (2005)
considered the standard repeated game, but following Simon (1987), they assumed that
the agents are not utility maximizers, but that their actions are guided by the satisﬁc-
ing behavior. Bendor, Mookherjee, and Ray (2007) extended the analysis of Karandikar,
Mookherjee, Ray, and Vega-Redondo (1998) from the class of repeated 2 × 2 games to
a general class of games, implicitly assuming the existence of a centralized information
processing unit that aggregates the aspiration levels and disseminates the summary sta-
tistics to the individual agents.
In section 2, we formally describe the model where some agents are successfully matched,
while other agents are actively searching for a partner under the assumption that the
strategy space of each agent is continuous. A natural state would be the proﬁle of coalitions
that describes the set of successfully matched pairs along with the actions they are playing
and the group of agent who are yet to be matched. The number of states is signiﬁcantly
larger than the number of agents, which poses considerable challenge. In addition, the6 IN-KOO CHO AND AKIHIKO MATSUI
evolution of the aspiration vectors contains feedback features as the decision of each agent
is aﬀected by the aspiration, which in turn aﬀects the evolution of aspiration vectors. In
section 3, we address these two challenges. First, we identify the deterministic dynamics
by characterizing the dynamics of the mean of the stochastic process of aspiration vectors
in terms of an ordinary diﬀerential equation (ODE). Second, we prove the convergence
property of the ODE by analyzing a lower dimensional dynamics. That is, instead of the
dynamics of the entire proﬁle, we shall focus on the dynamics of the two extreme values–
the highest and lowest aspirations–and show that these two values must converge to a
Pareto eﬃcient pure state. Section 4 concludes the paper.
2. Model
2.1. Environment. Consider an economy populated with a ﬁnite number of inﬁnitely
lived agents. Time is discrete: t =1 ,2,.... Let I = {1,2,...,n} be the set of agents
where n is an even number greater than or equal to four. Each agent searches for a
partner. This search process is completely random among those who are not matched.
When two agents meet, they work together in that period to realize how much output
the two of them can produce and what the share of each agent will be. They then decide
whether or not to form a partnership. The partnership is formed only if both the agents
agree to do so. If one of them refuses to form a partnership, then they go back to the
pool of search without producing anything in that period, which induces zero payoﬀ, and
wait for another match in the next period. On the other hand, if they agree to form a
partnership, the partnership continues until it breaks up with an exogenous shock, which
occurs with probability 1 − δ ∈ (0,1) at the end of each period. We call δ<1t h e
continuation probability.
The set of agents in the (random matching) pool at the beginning of period t is denoted
by Ut. The other set Uc
t = I \ Ut contains the agents who form a partnership in the
beginning of the period. We suppress the time subscript from Ut and Uc
t whenever the
meaning is clear and write U and Uc instead. We write the matched pair of agents i and
j as {i,j}. Uc is partitioned into a ﬁnite number of pairs. Let us write Uc as a partitionMATCHING, ASPIRATIONS, AND LONG-TERM RELATIONSHIP 7
of Uc into pairs, i.e.,
Uc = {{i1,j 1},...,{ik,j k}},
where is  = is , js  = js  for s  = s  and is  = js  hold.
When two agents meet, the total value of their productivity as well as their respective
shares is determined exogenously. Suppose that agents i and j meet. Their prescribed
payoﬀs are then given by
ui = θiu
uj = θju,
where u is a relation-speciﬁc output from the partnership, and θi is player i’s share;
0 ≤ θi ≤ 1a n dθi + θj = 1, which reﬂects their bargaining power. Both θi and u are
stochastically determined. Let νu,θ be the probability distribution over (u,θ1,θ 2). Let
V ⊂ R2 be the set of all feasible (u1,u 2) from the partnership. The measure νu,θ induces
a probability distribution over V , which is denoted by ν.
Assumption 2.1. The measure ν has a full support over V , which is a compact convex
set with a non-empty interior. The measure ν has no atom and has a density function fν,
which is symmetric with respect to the 45 degree line, i.e., fν(xi,x j)=fν(xj,x i) for all
(xi,x j) ∈ V , continuously diﬀerentiable and concave over V .
All conditions–except for the concavity of fν–are fairly standard regularity conditions.
The symmetry around the 45 degree line is natural, as we treat the bargaining power of
the two partners equally in the ex ante sense. The heterogeneity among players arises only
from their diﬀerent past experiences.
The concavity of fν is imposed only to address some technical issues in the analysis.
Note that these assumptions imply that fν(x + z,x− z) is (weakly) decreasing in |z|.
The uniform distribution over V satisﬁes these assumptions, which is common in the
labor market search models (e.g., Mortensen and Pissarides (1994)). In a certain sense,
the uniform distribution poses the worst possible scenario toward achieving any form of
coordination between the two partners, not to mention among n players in a society,
because any pair of utilities is equally likely.8 IN-KOO CHO AND AKIHIKO MATSUI
Let





then (u∗,u ∗) corresponds to the Nash bargaining solution with the origin as a threat point.
Roughly speaking, our task is to show that the social dynamics let (u1,u 2)c o n v e r g et o
the Nash bargaining solution, even if (u1,u 2) is uniformly distributed over V initially.
If both i and j decide to keep the pair in period t,t h e n{i,j}∈U c at the beginning of
period t + 1 with probability δ ∈ (0,1) and i,j ∈ U with probability 1 − δ.
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Figure 1: Timing of Matches and Decisions
2.2. Behavior Rule. To complete the formal description of the model, we have to specify
how player i decides to form a partnership with player j after observing ui. It is certainly
an option to model the long-term relationship as a repeated game and to endow each player
with a full set of repeated game strategies to invoke an equilibrium analysis. However, as
we are interested in the case with continuation probability δ<1 being close to 1, a model
with fully rational players leads to a large set of equilibria without any guidance to select
a particular outcome.MATCHING, ASPIRATIONS, AND LONG-TERM RELATIONSHIP 9
Instead, we opt for a boundedly rational player who has a very limited computational
capability. The agents of the economy do not know the distribution of outputs and their
respective bargaining powers, nor do they know the strategies of other agents. Instead of
solving the dynamic programming problem as a rational player in a repeated game would
have done, our players use a simple rule of thumb to decide whether or not initiate a
long-term relationship as envisioned by Simon (1987).
In period t with t>1, whether or not agent i agrees to form a partnership, say, {i,j},







Following Simon (1987) and Karandikar, Mookherjee, Ray, and Vega-Redondo (1998),
we call ait aspiration of player i at t, or simply, aspiration. Agent i agrees to form a
partnership if uit >a it, or chooses to go back to the pool otherwise.
The formation of a partnership requires mutual agreement. Therefore, players i and j
form a partnership only if both uit >a it and ujt >a jt.
Let vo be the one-shot expected payoﬀ of agent i ∈ U, which is calculated as
vo =

(u ,u  )∈V
u  dν(u ,u   ).
Note that vo <u ∗.
Note that we assume very little computational capability of the players in their search
for their partners and in deciding whether or not to initiate a long-term relationship.
The agents of the economy do not know the distribution of outputs and their respective
bargaining powers, nor do they know the strategies of other agents. Hence, the agents do
not use dynamic programming to calculate the threshold above which they agree to form
a partnership. Instead, they use a simple rule of thumb. It is instructive to understand
the social outcome that arises under the minimal computational capability of the players
before examining a more elaborate behavior.
3. Analysis
Let at =( ait)i∈I be the proﬁle of average payoﬀs in period t. Our focus of interest is to
understand the asymptotic properties of at, which is a random vector in RI. The dynamics10 IN-KOO CHO AND AKIHIKO MATSUI
of at poses a numbers of challenges. First, since agent i has generally been matched with
many diﬀerent agents in the past, ait is aﬀected by this history in a complex manner.
Second, since the decision of agent i is aﬀected by ait, the feedback from the decision to
the history makes the stochastic process at non-stationary. Third, the evolution of ait is
aﬀected by the entire vector at =( a1,t,...,a n,t). As we analyze an economy with a large
ﬁnite number of agents, we have to keep track of a random vector in a high dimensional
Euclidean space. Indeed, even with the simple decision rule, a state is described as
((ai)i∈I,(ui)i∈I,(U,Uc)),
which is too large to handle as it is.
We ﬁrst use the stochastic approximation technique, analyzing the dynamics of the
mean of the average payoﬀs of individual agents instead of the sample path induced by the
stochastic process. Since the average payoﬀs evolve much more slowly than the present
payoﬀs and the matching patterns, we shall ﬁrst investigate the evolution of the mean
from a ﬁxed proﬁle of the average payoﬀs. Once we characterize the local evolution of the
average payoﬀs, we can approximate the sample path of the average payoﬀs in terms of
the trajectory induced by an associated ordinary diﬀerential equation (ODE).
We still have to handle diﬀerent ODE’s for diﬀerent agents to understand the asymptotic
properties. Instead, we use the model reduction technique (Meyn (2007)) by focusing on
the dynamics of a couple of key variables in order to infer the relevant properties of the
dynamics of at. We construct a simple Lyapunov function to summarize the key features
of the dynamics into a function deﬁned over a lower dimensional Euclidean space to pin
down the stability and the convergence properties of at.
3.1. Preliminaries. In order to make this paper self-contained, we introduce notation
and deﬁne concepts needed for later analysis. We draw our material from Kushner and
Yin (1997), which provides a comprehensive introduction to the stochastic approximation
technique.
We write (2.1) in a recursive form
(3.2) ait = ai,t−1 +
1
t
(ui,t−1 − ai,t−1)MATCHING, ASPIRATIONS, AND LONG-TERM RELATIONSHIP 11
where ui,t−1 is player i’s utility realized in period t − 1. Let at =( a1,t,...,a n,t). The
following conditions are needed.
A.1 supt,i E|ui,t|2 < ∞
A.2 There are measurable functions Ψi(at)a n dβi,t such that
Etui,t =Ψ i(at)+βi,t
where Et is the expectation conditioned on the information available at the begin-
ning of period t.





t < ∞ with probability 1.
Deﬁne τ0 =0 ,a n dτK =
K
t=1 1/t for K ≥ 1. For τ>0, deﬁne m(τ) as the unique K
such that τK ≤ τ<τ K+1. Given a discrete time stochastic process {at}∞
t=1,w ec o n s t r u c t
a continuous time stochastic process a0(τ) through a continuous time interpolation:
a0(τ)=aK if τK ≤ τ<τ K+1.
Deﬁne the (left) shifted process aK(τ)a s
aK(τ)=a0(τK + τ).
The classic results of the stochastic approximation consist of two parts: the approximation
and the convergence of {at}. Let us state a basic theorem (Theorem 2.1 in Kushner and
Yin (1997)) adapted for our model. A complete proof for much more general environments
can be found in Kushner and Yin (1997).
Theorem 3.1. Consider an ordinary diﬀerential equation (ODE)
˙ ai =Ψ i(a) ∀i
or more compactly,
(3.3) ˙ a =Ψ ( a)
where Ψ=( Ψ 1,...,Ψn).12 IN-KOO CHO AND AKIHIKO MATSUI
Suppose that A.1–A.4 hold for (3.2). Then, the sample path of the discrete time sto-
chastic process {at}∞














with probability 1 where a(0) = aK(0).
For a large t, the interpolated sample path of at remains close to the trajectory induced
by (3.3). Since (3.3) approximates the stochastic process {at}, we call (3.3) the associated
ODE or simply the ODE.
Among the four assumptions, A.1 and A.4 immediately follow the fact that the under-
lying game has the compact set V of feasible payoﬀ vectors. In Section 3.2 we compute
Ψi and check its continuity. In Section 3.3, we characterize the associated ODE and iden-
tify the neighborhood of the symmetric eﬃcient outcome as the region within which any
absorbing set is conﬁned. Then, we obtain the main convergence result (Theorem 3.8) by
invoking Theorem 3.1.
3.2. Markov Process under a Fixed Aspiration Proﬁle. As the ﬁrst step to invoke
the stochastic approximation, let us for a moment ﬁx a proﬁle of average payoﬀs, a =
(ai)i∈I,w i t h





Although a evolves over time, its speed of change becomes signiﬁcantly slower than the
speed at which the agents’ decisions to form a partnership as t increases. Our initial task
is to describe the dynamics as a Markov process by considering for a moment that proﬁle
a is ﬁxed.
By ﬁxing a, we essentially eliminate the impact of payoﬀs in the long-term relationship.
Thus, we are not only able to suppress a but also u from the description of the state.
Hence, the state in the beginning of each period consists of the following two elements:
• the set of agents in the pool, and
• the pairs of agents continued from the previous period.MATCHING, ASPIRATIONS, AND LONG-TERM RELATIONSHIP 13
A state is, therefore, described as a pair (U;Uc)w h e r eU is a subset of I with an even
number of elements and Uc is a partition of Uc into pairs, i.e.,
q =( U;{{i1,j 1},...,{iK,j K}}),i k  = i ,j k  = j ,i k  = i ,
where {ik,j k} (k =1 ,...,K) is a pair continued from the previous period. Note that
Uc = ∅ holds if no pair is in the satisﬁed match from the previous play, and that U = ∅
holds if everyone is matched and satisﬁed. Let Q be the collection of all the states.
Given a state q,a n dg i v e ni,j ∈ U,l e tx(ai,a j) be the probability that agents i and j
form a long-term relation, i.e.,




I(ui − ai > 0)I(uj − aj > 0)dν(ui,u j),
where I(·) is an indicator function:
I(ui − ai > 0) =

1i f ui − ai > 0,
0o t h e r w i s e .
Note that x is symmetric, i.e., x(ai,a j)=x(aj,a i) and monotonically nonincreasing in
both the arguments.
Given an average payoﬀ proﬁle a,l e t
Q(a)={q =( U;Uc) ∈ Q|x(ai,a j) > 0 for all {i,j}∈U c}.
Then the Markov process restricted to Q(a) is ergodic, while all states in Q \ Q(a)a r e





satisfying μ∗(a)(q) = 0 for all q ∈ Q \ Q(a).2 Note that μ∗(a) is continuous in a since ν
has no mass point. This leads to A.3 of Subsection 3.1.
This stationary distribution μ∗(a) determines the unconditional probability zi(a)t h a t





2This is because every state, including (I;∅), can be reached from (I;∅) in one step, and vice versa.14 IN-KOO CHO AND AKIHIKO MATSUI
and zi,t(a) for the unconditional probability that agent i remains in the pool of singles
at t. We can deﬁne the probability of his forming a (new) long-term relation with some















where q =( Uq;Uc
q)a n d# Uq is the number of elements in Uq.W e a l s o d e n o t e b y pi(a)
the corresponding probability under the stationary distribution μ∗.N o t i c et h a tpi,t(a)i s








Furthermore, since the probability of joining the pool is 1−δ after both agree to continue
the relationship, we have
zi,t+1(a)=( 1− pi,t)zi,t +( 1− δ)(1 − zi,t(a)).
Letting t go to inﬁnity, we have
(3.7) zi(a)=
1 − δ
1 − δ + pi(a)
.
Intuitively, if a player has a low aspiration level, then his chance of forming a successful
partnership would be higher than a player with a higher aspiration level. As a result, the
probability that a player stays in the pool, zi(a), would be a decreasing function of the
aspiration level of player i. The next lemma partially conﬁrms this simple, but critical,
observation.
To state the lemma, we need some preparation. Given a =( a1,...,a n), deﬁne
a(1) =m i n {a1,...,a n}
and given a(1),...,a (i), deﬁne
a(i+1) =m i n

{a1,...,a n}\{ a(1),...,a (i)}
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By (i), we mean the player with the i-th lowest aspiration among {a1,...,a n}.I np a r t i c -
ular,
a(n) =m a x {a1,...,a n}.
Lemma 3.2. For a given a =( a1,...,a n),
z(1)(a) ≤ z(n)(a).
Proof. The Markov process over Q converges to the unique stationary distribution regard-






for an arbitrary initial distribution μ0.
Recall that x(ai,a j) is symmetric:
x(ai,a j)=z(aj,a i)
and a decreasing function of the aspiration levels:
x(a(i),a (k)) ≤ x(a(i ),a (j )) ∀i ≥ i , ∀j ≥ j ,i = j.
Thus,
x(a(1),a j) ≥ x(ak,a (n))=x(a(n),a k)
for all j  =1a n dk  = n.F r o m( 3 . 6 ) ,w eh a v e
p(1),t(a) ≥ p(n),t(a)
for all t.T h u s ,
p(1)(a) ≥ p(n)(a)
holds. Then from (3.7), we have
z(1)(a) ≤ z(n)(a).
   
Given ai and aj,l e tvij be the conditional expected payoﬀ of player i when players i





I(ui − ai)I(uj − aj)uidν(ui,u j) ≥ x(ai,a j)ai.
Let vi(a) be the conditional expected payoﬀ when agent i stays in the same pair from the







Note that vi(a) >a i always holds.
Let us deﬁne a state contingent expected utility function of player i for a given a:
ui : Q → R
suppressing its dependency on a to simplify notation. Given q ∈ Q,i fi ∈ U,t h e n
ui(q)=vo.
If q =( U,Uc)s a t i s ﬁ e s{i,j}∈U c,t h e nui(q) represents the expected utility conditioned
on forming a successful partnership, i.e.,
ui(q)=vij.
Thus, the expected payoﬀ in this stationary state is written as




= zi(a)vo +( 1− zi(a))vi(a). (3.8)
We state a series of preliminary results that show how the expected utility gain Eμ∗(a)[ui−
ai] is aﬀected by the proﬁle of aspirations, a.
Lemma 3.3. Given a, we have
Eμ∗(a)[ui − ai|{ i,k}∈U c] > Eμ∗(a)[uj − aj|{ j,k}∈U c]
if ai <a j holds.MATCHING, ASPIRATIONS, AND LONG-TERM RELATIONSHIP 17
Proof. Note that agents i (resp. j)a n dk form a long-term relation if and only if ui >a i
(resp. uj >a j)a n duk >a k.





(u  − ai)dν(u ,u   )





(u  − aj)dν(u ,u   )
P[u  >a j and u   >a k]
. (3.9)
We claim that (3.9) is positive if aj >a i, using the assumptions on the distribution of








dν(u ,u   )


























fν(u ,u   )du  ,
and
amax =s u p {u |Fak(u ) > 0}.









(u  − ai)Fak(u )du 

· Fak(ai) < 0.
Noticing that Fak(u ) is concave, we consider the following three cases.
Case (i) Fak(u ) is decreasing in u  on [ai,a max]. We have
 amax
ai














which holds due to the concavity of Fak.18 IN-KOO CHO AND AKIHIKO MATSUI
Case (ii) Fak(u ) is increasing in u  on [ai,a max]. We have
 amax
ai
(u  − ai)Fak(u )du  <
 amax
ai
(amax − ai)Fak(u )du .




Fak(u )du  +( amax − ai)Fak(ai) < 0,
which holds since Fak(ai) <F ak(u )h o l d sf o ra l lu  ∈ [ai,a max].
Case (iii) Fak(u ) is increasing and then decreasing on [ai,a max]. Fix a  that satisﬁes
∂Fak(a )
∂u  =0 .




Fak(u )du  =
 a 
ai




Then we apply exactly the same arguments as in Cases (i) and (ii) to the ﬁrst and second
term of the right hand side of the equation to prove the lemma.    
The following lemma is an easy corollary whose proof is omitted since it is essentially
t h es a m ea st h a to fL e m m a3 . 3 .
Lemma 3.4. Given the average payoﬀ proﬁle a, we have
Eμ∗(a)[ui − ai|{ i,k}∈U c] > Eμ∗(a)[ui − ai|{ i, }∈U c]
if ak <a   holds.
The next lemma uses the assumption on the distribution of (u ,u   ). Its proof is a matter
of tedious calculation, using the fact that
fν(ai + x + z,aj + x − z) ≥ fν(ai + x − z,aj + x + z)
holds for all x ≥ 0a n d0≤ z ≤ x, which is due to the symmetry around the 45 degree
line and the concavity of fν.
Lemma 3.5. Given the average payoﬀ proﬁle a, we have
Eμ∗(a)[ui − ai|{ i,j}∈U c] ≥ Eμ∗(a)[uj − aj|{ i,j}∈U c]
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Note that since vo is the average payoﬀ in the pool and the agents form a long-term
relationship only if their payoﬀs are higher than the past average payoﬀs, a(n) ≥ vo must
hold.
Lemmata 3.4 and 3.5 together imply
min
k =(1)
Eμ∗(a)[u(1) − a(1)|{ (1),k}∈U c] > max
  =(n)
Eμ∗(a)[u(n) − a(n)|{ (n), }∈U c]
for all k,  if a(1) <a (n). Indeed, if ai <a j holds, then for all ak,a   ∈ [ai,a j], we have
Eμ∗(a)[ui − ai|{ i,k}∈U c] ≥ Eμ∗(a)[ui − ai|{ i,j}∈U c]
≥ Eμ∗(a)[uj − aj|{ i,j}∈U c] ≥ Eμ∗(a)[uj − aj|{ j, }∈U c]
where the ﬁrst and the third inequalities come from Lemma 3.4, and the second inequality
comes from 3.5. This together with the deﬁnition of vi(a) implies
(3.12) v(1)(a) − a(1) ≥ v(n)(a) − a(n).
Now, we are in a position to state the following key result.
Proposition 3.6. If a(1) <a (n) holds, then we have
(3.13) Eμ∗(a)[u(1) − a(1)] > Eμ∗(a)[u(n) − a(n)].
Proof. Suppose that a(1) <a (n) holds. Using (3.8), we can write
Eμ∗(a)[u(1) − a(1)]=z(1)(a)(vo − a(1))+( 1− z(1))(v(1)(a) − a(1))
>z (1)(a)(vo − a(n))+( 1− z(1))(v(n)(a) − a(n)) (3.14)
≥ z(n)(a)(vo − a(n) +( 1− z(n))(v(n)(a) − a(n)) (3.15)
= Eμ∗(a)[u(n) − a(n)].
(3.12) together with the assumption of the proposition implies the strict inequality in
(3.14), and (3.15) uses the fact that
z(1)(a) ≤ z(n)(a)a n dvo <a (n) <v (n)(a).
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3.3. Evolution of Aspiration. The key step toward analyzing the asymptotic properties
of the distribution of average payoﬀs is identifying the associated ODE of the individual
average payoﬀ. The evolution of the mean of the average payoﬀ around a small neigh-
borhood of ai is dictated by the diﬀerence between ai and the expected payoﬀ associated
with the invariant distribution of the transition matrix (Kushner and Yin (1997)),
(3.16) ˙ ai = Eμ∗(a) [ui] − ai = Eμ∗(a) [ui − ai].
Note also that we eventually have ai ≥ vo for all i with probability one since the expected
value of ai is a convex combination of vo and E[u  >a i], which is greater than or equal to
vo. This fact implies (3.13), and therefore, (3.16) implies the following proposition.
Proposition 3.7.
(3.17) ˙ a(n) − ˙ a(1) < 0.
Suppose now that a(n) = a(1) =ˆ a.T h e nˆ a is no more than u∗.F i xζ>0, a suﬃciently




u  >ˆ a





u  >ˆ a
u dν(u ,u   )/ˆ p.
Note that ˆ v>ˆ a by deﬁnition. Moreover, using the assumption on ν, we can verify that
ˆ v ≥ (u∗ +ˆ a)/2.
Note that Q(a)=Q in this case. This implies that μ∗(a) is continuous in a in the
neighborhood of (ˆ a,...,ˆ a). Also, since every agent has the same average payoﬀ ˆ a,t h e
dynamics is relatively easy. Indeed, since the transition probability of each agent from the
pool to the matched state is ˆ p, while that from the matched state to the pool is given by
(1−δ), each agent is in the pool and in the match with the probabilities of (1−δ)/(1−δ+ˆ p)
and ˆ p/(1 − δ +ˆ p), respectively. Hence, the expected payoﬀ is given by
Eμ∗(a)[ui]=
1 − δ
1 − δ +ˆ p
vo +
ˆ p
1 − δ +ˆ p
ˆ v.
Since ˆ p is independent of δ,w eh a v e
Eμ∗(a)[ui] → ˆ v ≥
u∗ +ˆ a
2
, as δ → 1.MATCHING, ASPIRATIONS, AND LONG-TERM RELATIONSHIP 21
In particular, if we let δ ∈ (0,1) satisfy
ζ2
2(1 − δ)(u∗)2 + ζ2
u∗ +ˆ a
2
>u ∗ − ζ,
then ˆ a<u ∗ − ζ implies
ˆ p




This in turn implies
˙ ait = Eμ∗(a)[ui] − ˆ a>0,
for all i ∈ I.
As a result, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 3.8. ∀ζ>0 ∃δ < 1 ∀δ ∈ (δ,1)
u∗ − ζ ≤ lim inf
t→∞
a(1),t ≤ lim sup
t→∞
a(n),t ≤ u∗ + ζ
with probability 1.
4. Concluding Remarks
In a society populated with players who have very limited computational and forecasting
capabilities, the decentralized matching process can generate a uniform standard to initiate
a long-term relationship. For example, if the underlying game has the structure of the
prisoners’ dilemma game, then Theorem 3.8 implies that a long-term relationship cannot
be formed if one party is greedy in the sense that he receives more than the cooperative
outcome.
In our model, the players are ex post heterogeneous because each player can go through
a diﬀerent experience, which is then summarized into a diﬀerent level of aspiration. Yet,
through a decentralized matching process, every player comes to have the same criterion
for starting a long-term relationship.
The intuition is simple and robust. Whenever a player is trying to be greedy, he will
be dumped into the pool of singles where he has to go through a matching process. If his
aspiration is substantially higher than the cooperative outcome, then he is more likely to
fail to form a successful long-term relationship. As he goes through a long period of failed
attempts, his aspiration level goes down. With a lower aspiration level, he can then form
a successful long-term relationship.22 IN-KOO CHO AND AKIHIKO MATSUI
The robustness of the intuition in turn makes our result very much robust against a
small perturbation of the basic model. For example, if we allow each player to deviate
from the agreed action with a small probability in each period, then the same result holds.
In the basic model, the aspiration is a simple average of the past payoﬀs. If we replace
the simple average with the discounted average, then the same result is obtained as the
rate at which the previous period’s payoﬀ is discounted converges to 1.
There are many tasks to be undertaken in the future. First, if we would like to use this
analysis for labor search, we should consider two population. The second point, which is
related to the ﬁrst, is that in order to show its real usefulness, we should study economies
with heterogeneous agents. The present model assumes ex ante identical agents, who are
diﬀerent only in terms of experiences. Diﬀerences in potential productivity may lead to
diﬀerent long-term payoﬀs. If we solve such a model, then we may be able to study income
inequality based on diﬀerences in ability in the search theoretic context. Third, if we are
interested in repeated games, we may need to consider more sophisticated strategies than
the threshold ones. How we can extend the strategy space beyond the set of threshold
strategies is a topic for future research.MATCHING, ASPIRATIONS, AND LONG-TERM RELATIONSHIP 23
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